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I. INTRODUCTION

Federalism is making a comeback in the United States. The federal
government is both unwilling and unable to solve many urgent social
problems. State governments, unsurprisingly, are constantly looking for
* The author is an associate with Watkins & Eager PLLC, a full-service law firm in
Jackson, Mississippi. The author received a Bachelor of Arts in Interpersonal Communication
from Mississippi College and a Doctor of Jurisprudence from Vanderbilt University Law
School. The author would like to thank Professor Robert Mikos, Ryan Holt, John Howell,
Natalie Elliott, and Laura Hartley for their assistance with the preparation of this Article.
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alternative solutions to interstate issues when Congress fails to act.
Recently, several U.S. states, along with Mexican states and Canadian
provinces, decided to act without federal approval to address the most
pressing of all social issues-climate change. The Western Climate
Initiative (WCI) was formed when the governors of five western states
agreed, in a "memorandum of understanding," to work together
informally to address climate change in the face of congressional
gridlock. The WCI now consists of twenty-seven North American
governments and includes almost one third of the North American
economy. 2 The WCI is "a collaboration of independent jurisdictions
working together to identify, evaluate, and implement policies to tackle
climate change at a regional level." 3 By 2012, the WCI members will
implement, through independent legislation in each member
jurisdiction, a fully operational cap and trade program which will
heavily regulate all sectors of the economy within the WCI member
jurisdictions. 4
All this newfound federalism must be tempered, however. When
federal leadership is lacking it is often noble when states work together
to solve social problems. It is not always constitutional, however. The
Interstate Compacts Clause (ICC) creates a constitutional check on
interactions between states. The ICC states that "[n]o State shall,
without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any agreement or
compact with another State, or with a foreign power . .. unless actually

invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay."' Thus,
coordinating state action like the WCI is not always constitutional.
Traditional ICC jurisprudence essentially asks three questions to
determine whether state action is constitutional. First, is the
coordinating action between the states a "compact"? Courts currently
apply two tests-the classic indicia test and the contract test-to
determine whether a compact exists. Second, if a compact exists, does
the compact raise federal concerns and, thus, require congressional
consent? Third, if the compact raises federal concerns, has Congress
consented to the compact?
Informal state coordination like the WCI, however, requires a new
test. The WCI was purposefully crafted to avoid the appearance that the
1. Christine 0. Gregoire et al., Western Regional Climate Action Initiative 1 (Feb. 26,
2007), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/func-startdown/ 11/.
2. Ben Arnoldy, Western States Propose Cap-And-Trade System for Greenhouse Gases,
CMsTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 24, 2008, at 1.
3. western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/index.php.
4. Design for the WCI Regional Program (2010), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.
org/component/remository/general/program-design/Design-for-the-WCI-Regional-Program/
[hereinafter Design Update] (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
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members are working together. The traditional ICC analysis is not
equipped to evaluate this type of covert state coordination. Thus, I
propose applying the test from antitrust law used to find whether a
"contract, combination, or conspiracy" exists between business entities,
to determine whether coordinate state action creates a compact. This
"conscious parallelism" test is useful for agreements like the WCI
where individual states follow independent but parallel paths to
regulation and take some additional steps toward an overt agreement.
This new test will supplement the classic indicia and contract tests when
a potentially covert agreement is present.
This Article evaluates the constitutional viability of the WCI as a
valid interstate compact using the ICC framework and the newly
incorporated conscious parallelism test. Other potential constitutional
challenges to the WCI are not addressed.6 The WCI is evaluated
because of its massive potential regulatory impact on businesses in
major sectors of the North American economy including California. The
WCI was selected instead of other regional climate change agreements
because the presence of Canadian and Mexican entities makes the WCI
more susceptible to constitutional challenge and because the WCI has
developed sufficiently to allow details of the agreement to be carefully
scrutinized.7
Climate change has not been a high priority in the Obama
administration and no federal action is imminent.8 Thus, the
constitutionality of the WCI is a live question. Even if federal action
was forthcoming the WCI should still be analyzed for several reasons.
First, the analysis will be useful as a guide in other interstate compact
scenarios besides climate change. Second, even if climate change
legislation is passed during the Obama administration, it would still take
one or two congressional cycles (i.e., several years) for climate change
6. For an overview of preemption and the commerce clause challenges to regional
climate change agreements, see ENVIR., ENERGY & RESOURCES BOOK PUB. COMM., AM. BAR.
Ass'N, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 335-36 (Michael B. Gerrard, ed. 2007)
[hereinafter GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW].
7. Three main regional initiatives currently exist in the United States: The Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, and the
WCI. RGGI is the oldest mandatory regional agreement on climate change in the United States.
RGGI is an agreement between ten northeastern states to create a mandatory cap-and-trade
program to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. It is similar to the WCI but much smaller in scale.
Overview of RGGI C02 Budget Trading Program, http://rggi.org/docs/programsum. The
Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord is a fledgling regional agreement involving
Midwestern states and Canadian provinces with similar goals to the WCI and RGGI which has
been endorsed by 6 states or provinces. Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord (Nov. 15, 2007),
http://www.midwesterngovemors.org/energysummit.htm (follow "Midwestern Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Accord" hyperlink).
8. Learningfrom State Action on Climate Change (May 2008), http://www.pewclimate.
org/policycenter/policyreports and analysis/state (follow "Update May 2008" hyperlink).
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legislation to be passed and implemented. Third, even if federal action
were imminent, the constitutionality of the WCI is still important
because with regional agreements as viable alternatives, the WCI
members' bargaining position with the federal government on climate
change legislation will strengthen. Fourth, most environmental laws
grew out of state "policy laboratory" experiments like the WCI, and a
finding that the WCI is constitutional will allow important
environmental policy developments to continue.9
The rest of the Article is organized in the following manner. Part II
discusses the background of the interstate compacts clause, interstate
compacts, and the WCI. Part III develops the three steps of an interstate
compact analysis, incorporates the conscious parallelism test, and
applies the analysis to the WCI. Part IV briefly concludes.
II. BACKGROUND

A. What is the InterstateCompacts Clause?
The ICC is an elegant compliment to the U.S. federal system. The
United States has a federal government with one national government
and multiple semi-autonomous state governments. Federalism creates
efficiencies not possible in a unitary or decentralized system. First,
federalism allows state governments to create geographically diverse
programs in order to better serve the "needs of a heterogeneous
society."' 0 Second, federalism also allows states to "serve as a
laboratory; and try new social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country."1 ' Third, federalism is a check on tyranny
because it "secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion
of sovereign power."l 2 Fourth, federalism creates political community
by "facilitat[ing] a kind or degree of political participation by citizens
that does not occur at the national level."' 3
However, a federal system also has deficiencies. Many times the
national government fails to address national problems, such as climate
change, for lack of political will, interest, or constitutional authority.14
9. Climate Change 101: Understanding and Responding to Global Climate Change
(Jan. 2011), http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/climate-change 101 (follow
"Download a pdf of the complete series hyperlink).
10. Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 2 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 78 (1998).
11. Id. at 78-79.
12. Id. at 79.
13. Id. at 81.
14. Congress's lack of attention to the future effects of deficit spending is a prime
example of this phenomenon.
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States in a federal system may not be able to effectively solve national
problems alone, either.' 5 The actions of a single state will not solve a
national problem like climate change for at least two reasons. First,
states have jurisdictional limits on their regulatory power. Simply put,
states cannot regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters outside of their
jurisdictions. Second, states have little incentive to enact costly
legislation to remedy national problems because of the presence of free
riders. When a state passes climate change legislation, other states have
more incentive not to act and to simply enjoy the fruits of the enacting
state's labor. Thus, in a federal system, individual states are confined
within their borders when the federal government fails to act. The
framers did not completely disarm the states from addressing national
issues, however. Rather, they reserved for the states a limited right to
work together by forming interstate compacts when the national
government fails to act.
The ICC prohibits states from entering interstate compacts without
congressional consent "unless actuallV invaded, or in such imminent
danger as will not admit of delay."' The ICC, along with the state
treaty prohibition' 7 and judicial opinion, defines the type of
coordinating actions states can take. Basically, states may never enter
treaties, states may enter agreements or compacts which impact the
federal system after receiving congressional consent, and states need no
consent for agreements or compacts which do not impact the federal
system and for other, lesser levels of cooperation.
Historically, the ICC served two basic functions: dispute resolution
and control of interstate alliances. The ICC codified the national
government's traditional role in resolving disputes between states.
Under English rule, the colonies had to present disputes between
colonies to the Crown for resolution.' 8 States were not allowed to work
together for practical and philosophical reasons.' 9 The Articles of
Confederation and, subsequently, the Constitution mirrored this
arrangement by prohibiting agreements between states without
congressional approval. 20 For example, interstate compacts with
15.
state Acts
16.
17.

See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 363 (2000) (noting that
may be preempted expressly or impliedly).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

18. CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF
INTERSTATE COMPACTS 3 (2006).

19. Id.
20. Christi Davis & Douglas M. Branson, Interstate Compacts in Commerce and
Industry: A ProposalFor "Common Markets Among States," 23 VT. L. REv. 133, 136 (1998).
See Articles of Confederation art. IX ("The United States in Congress assembled shall also be
the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise
between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other cause whatever
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congressional consent were regularly used to resolve early boundary
disputes between the states. 2 1
22
Additionally, the ICC discouraged alliances between states. States
have an incentive to create alliances in order to gain power over other
actors in the federal system, including the federal government. 23 The
ICC protects the federal government by limiting state combinations.
Given the state's historically broad police powers and the small size of
the pre-administrative state federal government, the ICC was more
likely viewed originally as a limitation on state power than an invitation
for creative state level solutions to regional and national issues.2 4
B. What are Interstate Compacts?
Interstate compacts are the agreements that states enter into pursuant
to the ICC. Fundamentally, interstate compacts are agreements between
states that become binding after Congress consents to the agreement.
"Historically, the interstate compact has received relatively little use." 25
Until the twentieth century, interstate compacts were used almost
exclusively to resolve boundary disputes. 26 However, the New York
Port Authority compact of 1921 and the Colorado River compact of
1922 revolutionized the use of interstate compacts early in the twentieth
century. The Colorado River Compact was the first compact to address
a regional problem-irrigation rights to water from the Colorado
27
River. It was also the first compact to be truly multilateral rather than
restricted to two or three states.28 The New York Port Authority
21. Davis &Branson, supranote 20, at 136.
22. BROUN ET AL., supra note 18, at 5.
23. Id.
24. This notion of a weak federal government that needs protection from the states is
consistent with Herbert Wechsler's argument in The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54
COLUM. L.REV. 543, 544 (1954) and Larry D.Kramer's argument in Putting the PoliticsBack
into the PoliticalSafeguards ofFederalism, 100 COLUM. L.REV. 215, 216 (2000). Kramer notes
that the Supreme Court's only significant role in federalism has been protecting the federal
government from the states, by maintaining "national supremacy against nullification or
usurpation by the individual states." Id.at 228.
25. FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
SINCE 1925, at 3 (Council of State Governments 1951). Throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, expanding population, new states, and migration under the program of
manifest destiny exacerbated boundary problems between states creating the need for interstate
compacts to resolve boundary disputes. In contrast, the need for interstate compacts to take
regulatory action was not as significant given the states' historically broad police powers and
relative weakness of the pre-administrative state federal government.
26. Id. But see id. n.10 (noting that exceptions include the Virginia/West Virginia
partition agreement and the Chesapeake and Ohio Company compact of 1825).
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id.
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compact was the first compact to create an interstate administrative
agency to deal with an ongoing problem-transit into New York.29 The
growth of multilateral interstate compacts administered by interstate
agencies to address regional problems has continued. 30 Additionally, the
overall number and subject matter of interstate compacts has expanded
considerably. 31 Specifically, use of environmental compacts expanded
in the 1960s and 1970s in conjunction with the growth of the
environmental movement. 32
Interstate compacts are an increasingly popular form of state action
because they create unique benefits. First, interstate compacts balance
competing local and national interests. 33 State control generally
generates more efficient regulation. 34 As the Supreme Court noted in
New York v. New Jersey:
the grave problem of sewage disposal presented by the large and
growing populations living on the shores of New York Bay is one
more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study and by
conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives
of the states so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any
court however constituted.
Simultaneously, an interstate compact preserves federal control
through the congressional consent requirement. This "ensures that
federal concerns are at the forefront of compact design and
construction" and allows the Congress to veto improvident compacts.36
Second, interstate compacts effectively address regional problems by
"breaking down fences."3 State boundaries are often arbitrary lines that
do not neatly encompass the scope of real life problems.3 8 "[A]n
interstate compact provides the opportunity to make decisions across
state boundaries without resorting to federalization . . . ."39
Third, interstate compacts are a stable and predictable way of

29. Id.
30. BRoUN ETAL., supranote 18, at 177-79.
31. Id. at 178-80 ("[C]ompacts govern a wide array of areas ranging from health,
education, taxation, and transportation to corrections, child welfare, energy, and the
environment .....
32. Id.
33. BROUN ET AL., supra note 18, at 28.
34. Id. at 27.
35. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
36. BROUN ET AL., supra note 18, at 28.
37. Davis & Branson, supra note 20, at 144.
38. BROUN ET AL., supra note 18, at 28.
39. Id.
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4

creating policy. Interstate compacts, once created, are not voluntary.4 1
Rather, they are binding and thus are "one of the few instruments that
can adequately provide for regional stability and uniformity in decision
making." 42 Interstate compacts are binding for several reasons. First,
when Congress consents to an interstate compact it becomes binding
federal law.4 3 Second, interstate compacts probably have legal force
over federal agencies.44 Third, even if not consented to by Congress,
interstate compacts are legally enforceable contracts between the
compacting states. 4 5 Finally, interstate compacts carry a moral force
stemming from their formality.4 6
Fourth, interstate compacts allow for a dynamic response to regional
problems. Most interstate compacts today create interstate agencies to
administer the compact's terms.4 7 These interstate agencies can quickly
48
change strategies given new information or circumstances.
C. What is the Western Climate Initiative?
The WCI is a regional agreement that creates an administrative
agency and uses economic controls to combat climate change. It was
enacted through individual legislation in each member jurisdiction.4 9
The WCI developed in 2007 out of climate change efforts in individual
states and two regional agreements, the West Coast Global Warming
Initiative and the Southwest Climate Chane Initiative, and it was
composed originally of only five U.S. states. Current WCI members
include the U.S. states of Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico,
Oregon, Utah, and Washington; and the Canadian provinces of British
Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. 5 ' WCI observers include the
40. Id.
41. Jessica A. Bielecki, Managing Resources With Interstate Compacts: A Perspective
From the Great Lakes, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 196 (2007).
42. Id. at 198.
43. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 566 (1855) (holding
that interstate compacts are the "law of the union" enforceable on the federal government).
44. See Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Nw. Power Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359,
1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
45.
46.

See BROUN ET AL., supra note 18, at 17.
ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supra note 25, at 105 (comparing the moral function of

contracts).
47. Id. at 5.
48. BROUNETAL., supra note 18, at27.
49. Gregoire et al., supranote 1, at 1-3.
50. Five Western Governors Announce Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Agreement
1 (2007), http://www.westernelimateinitiative.org/component/remository/func-startdown/1 1/
(last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
51. WCI Partners and Observers, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/wci-partnersand-observers-map (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
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U.S. states of Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, and Wyoming;
the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan, Yukon, New Brunswick, and
Nova Scotia; and the Mexican states of Baja California, Chihuahua,
Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, and Tamulipas. 52 "The WCI is a
collaboration of independent jurisdictions working together to identify,
evaluate, and implement policies to tackle climate change at a regional
level."s WCI member jurisdictions encompass one-fifth of the U.S.
economy and the majority of Canada' S.54
The original WCI members agreed, in a memorandum of
understanding negotiated by their governors at the winter 2007 meeting
of the Western Governors' Association, to collaborate to accomplish
three tasks through independent legislation: to set an overall regional
goal for reduction in GHGs; to create a multi-state registry to track
GHG emissions; and to develop a regional market-based system, such
as a cap and trade program, to achieve the regional goal.s
The WCI's regional goal is set at a 15% aggregate reduction in GHG
emissions below 2005 levels by 2020.56 The regional goal "does not
replace the partners' existing [individual] goals" and can incrementall
change based on new entrants to the WCI and updates to existing data.
To achieve the regional goal, WCI members should use "comprehensive
and economy-wide" "emissions reduction activities."58 Emissions
reduction activities should be market based, include all sectors of the
economy, and include all GHGs covered b the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Finally, each WCI
member "will update the other WCI partners .

.

. every two years to

ensure that actions are underway at levels consistent with full
achievement of the 2020 goal." 60
All WCI members have joined The Climate Registry (TCR), a multistate GHG registry which tracks GHG emissions. TCR "is a nonprofit
organization that provides meaningful information to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions." 61 "[TCR] establishes consistent, transparent standards
52. Western Climate Initiative: WCI Partners and Observers, http://www.westernclimate
initiative.org/wci-partners-and-observers-map (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
53. Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last visited Jan.
16, 2011).
54. Arnoldy, supra note 2, at 1.
55. Gregoire et al., supranote 1, at 2.
56.

WESTERN

CLIMATE

INITIATIVE

STATEMENT

OF

REGIONAL

GOAL

1

(2007),

http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/func-startdown/91/ (last visited
Jan. 16, 2011).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The Climate Registry, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 16,
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throughout North America for businesses and governments to calculate,
verify and publicly report their carbon footprints in a single unified
registry."62 Entities that emit carbon dioxide report their emissions to
TCR and TCR turns the raw data into useful figures for calculating the
WCI's progress toward the overall regional goal. 3 TCR is not solely the
repository of WCI emission data. Rather, it is "an emerging effort by
numerous states, provinces, and tribes to develop and manage a
common GHG reporting system" that encompasses "a large portion of
North America." 6
Finally, the WCI is creating a cap and trade program. A cap and
trade program controls GHG emissions by forcing businesses to
internalize the cost of pollution. Entities that emit GHGs must obtain a
permit. Only a limited number of permits are issued or sold, effectively
capping the amount of GHGs that may be emitted. However, the
permits may be traded between emitters. Thus, an emitter has an
incentive to reduce its emission of pollution so it can trade its excess
permits for other forms of capital. A cap and trade system is more
effective than traditional command and control regulation because the
emitter that can most cost effectively reduce its emissions will do so and
emitters that cannot reduce their emissions cost effectively have the
option to purchase additional permits instead of being regulated out of
the market.
The cap and trade program's design parameters were released on
March 13, 2009, in the Design Recommendationsfor the WCI Regional
Cap-and-Trade Program (Design Recommendations). 65 The Design
Recommendations were updated on July 27, 2010, in the Designfor the
WCI Regional Program (Design Update).6 6 The Design
Recommendations and Design Update outline a cap and trade scheme,
comparable to proposed federal cap and trade programs, which will
-j6 68
begin on January 1, 2012. 67 The scope of the plan is economy wide
and includes both upstream and downstream regulation.6 9 Entities that
2011).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Symposium, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1621, 1637 (2008).
65. DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WCI REGIONAL CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
(2009), http://www.westemclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/general/design-recomme
ndations/Design-Recommendations-for-the-WCI-Regional-Cap-and-Trade-Program/
(last
visited Jan. 16, 2011) [hereinafter DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS].
66. Design Update, supra note 4.
67. Id.
68. DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 65, at 13.
69. Id. Upstream regulation refers to regulating GHG emissions at the distributor or
importer level in order to avoid the difficulty of regulating individual consumers. The distributor
or importer then passes on the cost of the regulation to consumer through higher prices.
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emit over 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents must have a
permit called an emission allowance in order to emit GHGs into the
atmosphere. 70 Entities emitting over 10,000 metric tons of carbon
dioxide equivalents have to report their emissions to TCR.7 The
number of permits is capped by the total of all the WCI member's
individual GHG allowance budgets. 72 Permits are fungible across
jurisdictions to enable efficient trading.73 A minimum of 10% of permits
must be auctioned with the remainder given away based on prior
pollution levels.74 Offsets are encouraged and must comply with the
requirements of the Kyoto Protocol.s WCI members enforce the cap
and trade program within their borders. 76 While "each jurisdiction's rule
language may vary from the material included [in the cap and trade
program]," the WCI's goal is uniformity "so that the integrity of the
regional effort is assured." 77 The program is also designed to be
integrated with other cap and trade programs throughout the world.
Finally, the Design Recommendations require the creation of a regional
administrative organization to coordinate auctions and the adoption of
rules, serve as a forum for WCI members, and monitor the cap and trade

program. 79
In sum, the WCI is a multi-state solution to climate change which
utilizes cap and trade as its main regulatory device. The WCI was
negotiated by state governors as a "memorandum of understanding" and
will be enacted through individual legislation in each Member State.8 0
While it is similar to previous interstate compacts like the Port
Authority of New York compact or Colorado River compact, it is
broader in geographic and political scope.
The constitutionality of the WCI under the ICC is examined next.

Upstream regulation usually is necessary in the electricity generation and motor vehicle fuel
sectors to adequately cover all emissions. Downstream regulation refers to regulating the entity
that actually emits. Id.
70. Id. at 3.
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id. at 8.
75. Id. at 11. Offsets are emission credits given for activities which reduce GHGs.
Examples include carbon sequestration and tree farms. Id.
76. Id. at 12.
77. Design Update, supranote 4, at 5.
78. Id. at 23-25.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Gregoire et al., supra note 1, at 2.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Overview
The interstate compact is a 8 owerful tool for state action, one of the
oldest and most formal types. While the purposes and complexity of
interstate compacts have changed, the constitutional rules have
remained relatively undeveloped since Virginia v. Tennessee was
decided by the Supreme Court in 1893.82
It is necessary to ask three questions to determine if the WCI is a
constitutional interstate compact or unconstitutional state action. First,
is the WCI an agreement between states or is it independent legislation
enacted by separate states? Second, if the WCI is an agreement between
states, does it require congressional consent or is it merely a ministerial
agreement? Third, if the WCI is a compact to which congressional
consent is necessary, has consent been given?

B. Is the WCI a Compact?
1. Introduction
The first step in determining whether the WCI is constitutional is to
determine if there is in fact an interstate compact between states. State
action is not governed by the ICC unless an "agreement or compact"
between states exists.83 Agreements and compacts have been interpreted
to have functionally the same meaning, though the term "compact is
generally used with reference to more formal and serious
engagements." 84 A broad range of state action may count as a compact
for purposes of the ICC because "[t]he terms "agreement" or "compact"
taken by themselves are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all
forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of
subjects ....

State action to create an ongoing administrative body is a compact.
In Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission, Pennsylvania-New
Jersey v. Colburn, New Jersey and Pennsylvania created a "Bridge
81.

ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supranote 25, at 102 (contrasting reciprocal laws, uniform

laws, grants-in-aid, tax credits, administrative agreements, comity, and judicial settlement of
interstate disputes to interstate compacts).
82. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893).
83. Id.
84. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); but see Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 57172 (1840) (noting that "the words 'agreement' and 'compact' cannot be construed as
synonymous with one another" rather, agreements are single, temporary acts while compacts are
acts that last in "perpetuity, or for a considerable time").
85. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 517-18.
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Commission" to build bridges across the Delaware River that had the
power to purchase property and exercise eminent domain. 86 The
compact was negotiated by the states, adopted by the legislatures, and
consented to by Congress.
The negotiation of settlements to avoid trial by state Attorneys
General is a compact. In New Hampshire v. Maine, the two states
disputed the location of the "lateral marine boundary separating the
States."8 The states filed a lawsuit to determine the boundary, but prior
to trial, the Attorneys General of New Hampshire and Maine agreed to a
settlement and entered a motion requesting a consent decree to set the
boundary. While the court determined that the consent decree did not
require congressional consent, it nevertheless analyzed the consent
decree as a compact. 90
Multiple states adopting a model rule can create a compact. In US.
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission (MTC), individual states
adopted the Multistate Tax Compact. 91 Even though states did not
negotiate with each other and merely adopted a model rule, the state
action was considered a compact. 92
Finally, state legislation that becomes active only after other states
enact complementary legislation constitutes a compact. In Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System, the
court noted that when states enact banking laws containing concessions
for other states contingent on the other states enacting legislation with
reciprocal concessions, then a compact likely exists. 93
However, not all instances of coordinate state action are compacts.
States are increasingly experimenting with different levels of
cooperation, including model rules, interstate administrative agencies,
and reci rocal legislation, making identification of compacts more
nuanced. 4 Two rules are currently used to determine whether
coordinate state action rises to the level of a compact. First, coordinate
state action is a compact if the classic indicia of a compact exist.
Second, if coordinate state action creates a legally binding contract, then
a compact likely exists. However, the two traditional tests are not robust
enough to analyze the ever-expanding universe of coordinate state
86. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n, Pennsylvania-New Jersey v. Colbum,

310 U.S. 419,425-26 (1940).
87. Id. at 425.
88. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 364 (1976).
89. Id. at 364-65.
90. Id. at 369.
91. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,454,456 (1978).
92. Id. at 456 n.5, 496.
93. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159,
175 (1985).
94. See id.
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action. For example, the informal negotiation and independent
legislation used to create the WCI is likely not considered a compact
under the classic indicia or contract tests even though the WCI is a
complex regulatory agreement between twenty-seven different North
American governments. Thus, I propose applying the test from antitrust
law used to find whether a "contract, combination, or conspiracy" exists
between business entities to determine whether coordinate state action
creates a compact. Next, the WCI is analyzed under the two traditional
tests and under the antitrust conscious parallelism test in order to
determine whether a compact exists. 5
2. Classic Indicia Test
The WCI is likely not a compact under the traditional classic indicia
test. Coordinate state action is a compact if the classic indicia of a
compact are present. 96 The classic indicia of a compact were established
95. Even if coordinate state action constitutes a compact under the classic indicia,
contract, or antitrust test, the state action is not a compact if it also constitutes a treaty. The
Constitution allows states to enter an "agreement or compact ... with a foreign power" but does
not allow states to "enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10,
cls. 1, 3 (emphasis added). The courts have struggled to distinguish between agreements or
compacts on the one hand and treaty, alliances, or confederations on the other; however, some
guidance exists. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 540 (1840); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503 (1893); MTC, 434 U.S. at 472. Political or military accords are treaties and are not governed
by the interstate compacts clause. In Virginia v. Tennessee, the court held that treaties, alliances,
and confederations referred to military and political accords with foreign states, while compacts
and agreements referred to "private rights of sovereignty" like boundary questions and mutually
convenient intemal regulations. 148 U.S. at 517-20. Thus, on the rare occasion when states enter
into compacts with foreign powers, state action that is political or militaristic in nature is
unconstitutional. For example, in McHenry County v. Brady, a Canadian municipality and North
Dakotan municipality entered a contract to run a drain from North Dakota into Canada. 163
N.W. 540, 543 (Sup. Ct. N.D. 1917). The court had to decide whether this agreement "invade[d]
the treaty-making power which is vested in the federal government. Id However, since the
agreement did not involve an "essentially . .. national and governmental power," the agreement
did not violate the state treaty power. Id. at 544 (contrasting Holmes, 39 U.S. at 561). In
contrast, a state would not be allowed to agree with Canada to extradite a criminal without
federal approval. Id. The WCI is probably not a treaty. The WCI is a program that regulates
pollution. It does not contain any type of military agreement with Canada or Mexico. The mere
presence of foreign powers cannot mean that the WCI is a political agreement. Such an
overbroad definition would mean that all state-foreign power coordination would constitute
unconstitutional state treaties. However, then Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger stated that
California has its own foreign policy and the WCI could be seen as a political accord expressing
the WCI states' foreign policy. Symposium, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1621, 1622
(2008) (noting Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's position that California has its own foreign
policy). This seems unlikely, however, because the substance, and not the form, of the compact
is what a court looks to when deciding whether a compact exists. A full analysis of the treaty
provision is beyond the scope of this Article.
96. Northeast Bancorp,472 U.S. at 175.
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in NortheastBancorp and include: reciprocal limitations on state action;
the existence of multiple state legislatures in favor of fulfillment of a
common goal; evidence of negotiation between states; establishment of
a joint body or organization; and restrictions on the state's ability to
unilaterally withdraw from the arrangement by modifying its laws. 97
In Northeast Bancorp, Massachusetts passed an act that allowed
bank holding companies based in other New England states to acquire
Massachusetts-based banks and bank holding companies "provided that
the other New England State accord[] equivalent reciprocal privileges to
Massachusetts banking organizations." 8 The Massachusetts law was
created under the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company
Act (BHCA) which "regulates the acquisition of state and national
banks by bank holding companies" through the Federal Reserve
Board. 99 Under the Douglas Amendment, the Federal Reserve Board is
prohibited from "approving an application of a bank holding company
or bank located in one State to acquire a bank located in another State,
or substantially all of its assets, unless the acquisition is specifically
authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located
S
o100
Connecticut took advantage of Massachusetts's legislation by
passing a similar statute.101 Rhode Island and Maine then enacted
similar but less restrictive legislation. 102
The Northeast Bancorp court was tasked to decide whether the
states' legislation taken as a whole amounted to a compact. A compact
did not exist because "several of the classic indicia of a compact [were]
missing." 03 Specifically, the states' banking legislation did not
establish a joint organization, the states' statutes were not fully
conditioned on action by other states, the states could modify or repeal
the law unilaterally, and there was no reciprocation of the regional limit
by Rhode Island and Maine.104 Even though the states coordinated with
other states to pass the legislation, there was not enough coordinate state
action to create a compact.
The WCI likely does not qualify as a compact under the Northeast
Bancorp classic indicia test either. First, the WCI agreement does not
require reciprocal limits on WCI member actions. Reciprocity is the
most important indicator of a compact. In Northeast Bancorp, Maine
and Rhode Island benefited from Massachusetts's and Connecticut's
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

163-64.
162.
163.
164.
175.
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banking laws which preferred New England states. However, there was
no requirement in Massachusetts's and Connecticut's banking laws for
Maine and Rhode Island to similarly limit their banking laws to favor
New England states. Since Maine and Rhode Island benefitted from
Massachusetts's and Connecticut's favorable banking laws without
paying a price through reciprocal limitations on their actions, there was
no compact.
Similarly, WCI members only agree to be bound by minor limits to
state action when joining. Members must adopt "an economy-wide
greenhouse reduction goal" consistent with the WCI regional goal,
develop "a comprehensive multi-sector climate action plan," and
participate in TCR. 0 5 These requirements are largely precatory and
aspirational. Each member's legislation may vary from the cap and
trade program created by the WCI without penalty. Further, no
mechanism reviews whether the WCI members are enforcing these self
imposed limits. Additionally, Arizona has chosen not to participate in
the cap and trade portion of the WCI and has not been penalized. 1 6
Second, not all WCI members' legislatures favor the fulfillment of a
common goal. In Northeast Bancorp, "both legislatures favorred] the
establishment of regional banking in New England . . . ."

The

governors of the original WCI members stated in 2007 that they
"recognize[d] the need for collaboration among states to develop
climate change policies that provide consistent approaches to recognize
and give credit for actions to reduce GHG emissions."' 0 8 All subsequent
members have not agreed to this goal. Arizona Governor Jan Brewer
had to withdraw Arizona from the cap and trade portion of the WCI
because "[t]he Legislature [of Arizona] has attempted several times to
dismantle the state's climate-change pro rams and forbid its
participation in the cap-and-trade system."
But some legislatures,
including California's, do endorse the WCI.110 As the member with the
largest number of emitters and the most to lose from the cap and trade
scheme, California's endorsement is especially important.
Third, the WCI shows some evidence of negotiation. In Northeast
Bancorp, "there [was] evidence of cooperation among legislators,
officials, bankers, and others in the two states in studying the idea [of
105. Five Western Governors Announce Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Agreement,
supra note 50, at 1-2.
106. Sindya N. Bhanoo, Arizona Quits Western Cap-and-Trade Program, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2010; Shaun McKinnon, Arizona Quits Western Climate Endeavor, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Feb. 11, 2010.
107. Northeast Bancorp,Inc, 472 U.S. at 175.
108. Gregoire et al., supra note 1, at 2.
109. Bhanoo, supra note 106; McKinnon, supra note 106.
110. CAL. Gov. CODE § 12812.6 (2008) (empowers California executive branch to develop
compliance mechanisms to address climate change).
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regional banking] and lobbying for the statutes [to enact the
compact].""' Here, the WCI agreement was negotiated by the
governors of the five original WCI members.1 2 Also, the cap and trade
system and regional climate change goal were both developed
collaboratively by WCI members.11 3 Moreover, the WCI has grown
through stakeholder meetings in individual jurisdictions and through
collaborative efforts between jurisdictions.
Fourth, the WCI has, at best, established a weak regional
organization. The NortheastBancorp court was skeptical that a compact
could exist given the lack of a "joint organization or body."ll 4 The WCI
plans to create a "regional administrative organization" for the cap and
trade program "to reduce administrative costs and improve program
transparency and consistency."" 5 Also, the WCI itself is arguably a
regional organization given that it has a leadership structure,
publication, events, and committees.1 1 6 Moreover, the WCI has
extensive ties to TCR which, while broader in scope than the WCI,
includes all WCI members. Because multiple organizations with power
over specific WCI programs exist, an "administrative body with
extensive powers delegated to it by the [State]" likely does not exist."17
Fifth, the WCI does not restrict a member's ability to unilaterally
withdraw. There is no restriction on withdrawal from the WCI and
Arizona has largely withdrawn from the organization. 1 8 A compact can
exist without limitations on withdrawal, however. In MTC, a compact
existed even though the compact "permit[ed] any part to withdraw
from the Compact by enacting a repealing statute." 1 9 Withdrawal
limitations indicate a compact because they show that some of a state's
sovereign power has been transferred from the state to the compact.
Here, the WCI does not contain withdrawal limitations or any other real
limitations on state power. WCI members are supposed to enact a
111.
112.

NortheastBancorp, 472 U.S. at 175.
Gregoire et al., supranote 1, at 1.

113.

DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 65, at iv-v.

114. Northeast Bancorp, 472 U.S. at 175. Also, in MTC, the existence of "a multilateral
agreement creating an active administrative body with extensive powers delegated to it by the
States" was evidence of a compact. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,
472 (1978).
115.

DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 65, at 13.

116. Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimate initiative.org (last visited Jan.
16, 2011).
117. MTC, 434 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added).
118. Shaun McKinnon, Arizona quits Western Climate Endeavor, Am. REPUBLIC, Feb.
11, 2010, available at http://www.azcentral.com/Arizonarepublic/news/articles/2010/02/11/
20100211 climate-brewer02 11 .html; Sindya N. Bhanoo, Arizona Quits Western Cap-and-Trade
Program,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, at A20, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/
science/earth/12climate.html.
119. MTC,434 U.S. at 457.
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regional GHG reduction goal, create climate change legislation, and join
TCR, but none of those actions are permanent or mandatory.120 Thus, it
is unlikely that any real transfer of sovereign power will occur.
The WCI does not contain most of the classic indicia of a compact. It
does not contain reciprocal limits on state action because each state
passes, implements, and enforces regulations individually. Furthermore,
the WCI members' legislatures do not uniformly support the WCI's
goals. Finally, the WCI contains no limitations on withdrawal from the
compact. While the WCI does show evidence of negotiation and has
established a weak regional organization, on balance, the WCI has less
classic indicia than the non-compact in Northeast Bancorp and is likely
not a compact under the classic indicia test.1 2 1
3. Contract Test
The WCI is likely not considered a compact under the contract test
either. Coordinate state action is likely a compact if a contract is
negotiated between the states. In New Hampshire v. Maine, the two
states settled a dispute over fishing rights in Portsmouth Harbor and
asked the court to enter a consent decree.1 22 The court accepted without
discussion that a settlement agreement between the two states was a
compact. 2 3
Contracts between states are not automatically compacts. As the
MTC court noted, "the mere form of the interstate agreement cannot be
dispositive" because "[t]he Constitution looked to the essence and
substance of things, and not to mere form." 24 The court's reaction to
this observation in MTC was to create the factor based test in Northeast
Bancorp. After Northeast Bancorp, a finding that state action creates a
contract is not dispositive. However, because no court has held that a
compact does not exist when a legally enforceable contract has been
made between states, the existence of a contract strongly suggests a
compact.12 5
All traditional contract requirements are likely required for a
120. Five Western Governors Announce Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Agreement,
supra note 50, at 1-2.
121. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 472 U.S. 159,

175 (1985).
122. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1976).
123. Id.
124. MTC, 434 U.S. at 470 (analyzing a compact created through complementary
legislation even though it was not a "more formalized compact").
125. See Letter of William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser of the Department of State to
Senator Byron L. Dorgan of North Dakota regarding a Memorandum of Understanding signed
by the State of Missouri and the Province of Manitoba 2 (Nov. 20, 2001), http://www.state.gov/
s/l/22720.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
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compact to exist. 126 First, consideration must be exchanged. In Virginia
v. Tennessee, the border between the states deteriorated and was
disputed.127 Both states agreed to choose three commissioners each who
would meet and mark a boundary line between the states and make
recommendations about how to resolve disputes over claims to land on
each side of the border.128 Subsequent each state's legislature was to
However, while "[c]ompacts
ratify the report of the commissioners.
or agreements . . . cover all stipulations affecting the conduct or claims

of the parties," neither the appointment of the commissioners nor the
ratification by the legislatures created an agreement.' 30 Rather, "[t]he
legislative declaration will take the form of an agreement or compact
when it recites some considerationfor it from the other party affected
by it[.]"l 3 1 There was no agreement between the states until Virginia
and Tennessee "mutually declared the boundary established by
them."' 32 Thus, when the states enacted legislation recognizing the
border, an agreement was created because both states received
something of value.'13
Usually, compacts are negotiated formally and mutual promises by
states serve as consideration. 34 Here, the WCI members purposefully
avoided direct negotiations or mutual promises. Members do receive
benefits from membership. The members expect that national or
international climate change programs will emerge and put them well
ahead of the curve on cap and trade implementation and clean energy.
Further, WCI members benefit by becoming moral leaders on a pressing
social issue. Finally, the WCI members may also reap "existence value"
from preserving the environment.136 However, these benefits are likely
not consideration because they are not conditioned on mutual promises.
The WCI members have passed independent legislation and could
receive these same benefits even if acting individually.
BROUN ET AL., supra note 18, at 17-18.
127. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 504-05 (1893).
128. Id. at 511.
129. Id. at 515.
130. Id. at 520-21.
131. Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 521.
133. Id.
126.

134.

ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supra note 25, at 85.

135. WCI Comments to U.S. House of Representatives on Waxman-Markey Bill 1 (2009)
(last visited Jan. 16, 2011), http://www.westemclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/
WCI
general/WCI-Comments-to-U.S.-House-of-Representatives-on-Waxman-Markey-Bill/;
Letter to U.S. Senate 1 (2009) (last visited Jan. 16, 2011), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.
org/component/remository/func-startdown/l33/.
136. See David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 343, 343 (2004).
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Second, the compact must be negotiated by an agent empowered by
the state. In Holmes v. Jennison, the governor of Vermont agreed to
extradite a prisoner to Canada where he was wanted for murder.1 3 7 The
plurality noted that "states can act only by their agents and servants; and
whatever is done by them, by authority of law, is done by the state
itself."' 3 8 The governor was acting as the state's agent in making the
compact and therefore the compact was made with the force of state
law. 139 In contrast, in Louisiana v. Texas, a state health officer's
quarantine against another state was not an action carrying the force of
state law when the state did not authorize or confirm the quarantine.14 0
The WCI was likely originally negotiated by agents empowered to
bind the states to a compact. While the WCI was not negotiated by
specially designated representatives empowered by the state
legislatures, it was originally negotiated by state governors. It is unclear
whether the WCI governors acted pursuant to instructions from their
legislatures, although there was definite authorization in the case of
California. ' 4 However, traditionally when governors negotiate
compacts they are empowered by their legislature.
Third, an offer and acceptance or meeting of the minds must exist
between compacting parties. Here, though the original negotiation of the
WCI yielded a "memorandum of understanding" over the principles of
the WCI, no true exchange of promises occurred because the WCI
members are not requiredto take any action.
In summary, the WCI is probably not a compact under the contract
test. While the WCI was negotiated originally by agents with authority
to compact, no consideration for an agreement exists and no, true
exchange of promises occurred.
4. Conscious Parallelism Test
While the classic indicia and contract tests are somewhat helpful in
determining whether the WCI is a compact, they are not designed to
detect covert state cooperation like the WCI. The WCI does not contain
most of the classic indicia of a compact and yet is clearly state
coordination on a sophisticated level which may warrant congressional
review. 143 Further, the contract test only applies to one type of
137.
138.
extradite
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 561 (1840).
Id. at 573 (noting that while there was no statute giving the governor the power to
Holmes, Vermont's highest court held the governor's actions to be legal).
Id. at 562.
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 23 (1900).
CAL. Gov. CODE § 12812.6 (2008).
E.g., Holmes, 39 U.S. at 540.
See supraPart Ill.B.2.
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coordinate action, the overt business relationship. As the tulip, oil, steel,
baseball, telephone, diamond, and personal computer industries have
shown, many instances of coordinate action involve covert behavior. A
new test is needed to identify instances where covert state cooperation
creates a compact. Courts regularly identify covert coordination in other
contexts. For example, the crime of conspiracy is routinely proven b
circumstantial evidence of the conspirators' coordinating behavior.
Further, in antitrust law, business entities can be liable for secretly

working together.145
A variation of the test developed to sniff out antitrust violations
should also be used to determine whether covert state cooperation like
the WCI creates a compact. The Sherman Act makes "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations
. . . illegal." 46 This conscious parallelism test from antitrust law should
be used here for several reasons. First, a test based in antitrust law will
allow for more consistent and just results in ICC cases. A sophisticated
analysis is hard to create in the ICC context because of the low volume
of cases heard by the courts. By importing a test from a vigorously
debated, litigated, and well developed area of law such as antitrust, ICC
jurisprudence will quickly improve.
Second, states regulated by the ICC act similarly to the business
entities regulated by antitrust law. As market participants, states
generally act rationally and efficiently.' 47 While states are sometimes
motivated by civic concerns other than economics, generally, state
policies are market driven. Thus, importing antitrust law principles will
benefit ICC jurisprudence.
Two basic elements must be present for an antitrust violation to
exist: consciously parallel behavior and a "plus factor." Each will be
discussed in turn.
First, "conscious parallelism refers to the common practice among
firms in a concentrated industry of conducting their similar businesses
in a uniform manner, aware that their counterparts are pursuing the
same course of action." 48 This practice results in reduced competition
among participants.149 The "effects of conscious parallelism . . . are
144.
law).
145.

146.

E.g., United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994) (defining conspiracy under federal
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1 (2010).

Id.

147. States are routinely recognized as rationale market participants by the courts. E.g.,
Reeves v. William Stake, 447 U.S. 429,437 (1980).
148. D.J. Simonetti, Note, ConsciousParallelismand the Sherman Act: An Analysis and a
Proposal,30 VAND. L. REv. 1227, 1228 (1977).
149. Id.
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similar to the effects of an overt conspiracy" without the agreement. 50
An antitrust violation does not exist based on conscious parallelism
alone, however. Most businesses are motivated by similar goals and,
thus, produce similar policies.15 ' Further, businesses know their actions
will be replicated by their competitors.
The Supreme Court recognized this princile in Theatre Enterprises,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.1 2 In Theatre Enterprises,
owners of suburban movie theatres "uniformly rebuffed" offers to show
new movies in the suburban movie theatres and "adhered to an
established policy of restricting first-runs . . . to the eight downtown

theatres."l 53 All of the owners "advanced much the same reasons for
denying [the] offers[,]" including the economic unfeasibility of the
offers. Even though the theatre owners engaged in parallel business
behavior no antitrust violation occurred.' 5 5 The Court refused to assume
a conspiracy existed because all the businesses had an independent
economic incentive to refuse the offer.1 56 Thus, consciously parallel
action among businesses, while suspicious, is not sufficient to create a
"contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy."' 5 7 Similarly, Congress

should not have the authority to regulate WCI members who merely
enact parallel policies without more proof of coordinate action. Just like
other market participants, the WCI members will enact climate change
policies that balance risk and reward most efficiently. This behavior is
not sufficient to prove a compact exists.
When consciously parallel action by WCI members is accompanied
by additional factors, however, it should be strong evidence of a
compact. Courts have recognized at least three factors which, when
combined with parallel action, support a finding of a compact: express
collusion, actions against self interest, and market manipulation.
First, express collusion combined with consciously parallel behavior
creates a "contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy."' 5 1 In Cackling

Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that egg
distributors and producers conspired to monopolize the production,
distribution, and price of eggs.' The egg distributors and producers'

150.
151.
82 HARv.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 1229.
Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies,
L. REV. 1207, 1207 (1969).
346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
Id. at 539.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2010).
Id.
541 F. 2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1976).
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"price parallelism" was not enough to prove an antitrust violation.160
However, a conspiracy was proven when the price parallelism was
coupled with evidence of express collusion shown by "numerous
meetings," "correspondence," and "constant telephone calls between the
various co-conspirators. ,,l61
Similarly, evidence of express "collusion" by the WCI coupled with
consciously parallel action shows that a compact exists. The WCI,
almost by definition, engages in express "collusion" because it is an
organization. The WCI regional organization regularly communicates
with members, deliberates over WCI polices, and promulgates
regulations.162 Further, just like in Cackling Acres, the interactions by
the WCI regional organization are substantial and not merely
ministerial.163 These interactions, combined with parallel action by WCI
members is likely sufficient to create a compact.
Second, a business action against self interest combined with
consciously parallel behavior creates a "contract, combination, . . . or

conspiracy." 64 In Reading Industries, Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
vertically integrated members of the copper industr were accused of
suppressing prices by rationing copper to buyers.' "The defendants
acknowledge[d] that each of them could have charged higher prices
without losing sales ... and that each of them did ration supplies among
its customers, but they argued that each acted independently in
The business reasons the
refraining from raising its prices . . . .
copper sellers proffered as motivating their parallel action were
unpersuasive to the court because the actions were not in the copper
sellers' best interest. 167
Similarly, the WCI members' actions against self interest coupled
with consciously parallel action show that a compact exists. Here, the
WCI members may be acting against their self interest by joining the
WCI. In the short term, competitor states and provinces could easily
undercut the WCI members by not joining the WCI. Non-member
States and provinces would not be bound by the WCI's GHG emissions
caps and reporting requirements. Thus, competitor states and provinces
could lure businesses out of the WCI to their own jurisdictions. In the
long term, it is arguably still against the WCI members' self interest to
160. Id. at 245.
161. Id.
162. See WCI 2009-10 Work Plan (2009), available at http://www.westernclimate
initiative.org/component/remository/func-startdown/1 13/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
163. Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last visited Jan.
16, 2011).
164. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2010).
165. 477 F. Supp. 1150, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
166. Id. at 1154.
167. Id. at 1156.
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join because as the WCI implements GHG caps, non-members will free
ride on the benefits attained unless forced to join. WCI members expect
that joining the WCI will provide an innovation and first mover
advantage in environmental policy. However, that advantage will only
occur if cap and trade becomes mandatory or universally accepted, an
uncertain proposition. Thus, in the present economic and political
climate where no global climate change regulation or construct is
widely supported, it is arguably against the WCI members' economic
self interest to join.
Third, market manipulation combined with consciously parallel
behavior is enough to find a "contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy."
In American Tobacco v. United States, the three largest U.S. tobacco
companies regularly bid up the market price of raw tobacco to price
small tobacco companies out of the market.168 Further, all three
companies concurrently raised cigarette prices approximately seven
percent.169 The companies averred that the price increase was because
of "confidence in our industry" and the opportunity to secure additional
advertising revenue. 170 Subsequently, all three concurrently cut cigarette
prices approximately fifteen percent in order to "defeat the threat from
lower priced cigarettes .... ."171 The evidence of market manipulation
established an antitrust violation.172
Similarly, market manipulation by WCI members coupled with
consciously parallel action shows that a compact exists. Here, the WCI
is, in a sense, manipulating the market for individual state climate
change regulation. Because the WCI is regulating collaboratively, their
regulations will carry more weight with businesses, the federal
government, and foreign governments than an individual state's
regulations. The WCI regulations are more likely to be copied by other
individual states who wish to reduce costs because the WCI regulations
are more likely to be adopted as the norm. The WCI members will
corner the market on climate change regulation. This market
manipulation indicates both that the WCI members are acting
collaboratively and that a compact exists.
The WCI is a compact under the proposed conscious parallelism test.
WCI members have purposefully engaged in parallel legislation to form
the WCI. This consciously parallel behavior, when coupled with the
three other plus factors, indicates that the WCI is a compact. All three
plus factors exist: the WCI members engage in express coordination to
carry out their individual legislation, WCI members may have acted
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

328 U.S. 781, 801-02 (1946).
Id. at 805.
Id.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 814.
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against their self interest by joining the WCI, and WCI members
manipulated the climate change regulation market by regulating
collectively with independent but parallel legislation. Thus, it is likely
that the WCI's covert coordinate state action constitutes a compact.
5. The WCI is a Compact
In conclusion, the WCI is a compact even though it will be
implemented by individual legislation in each state. Though the WCI
does not qualify as a compact under the classic indicia or contract tests,
it should be analyzed under the proposed conscious parallelism test
because it is an example of informal state coordination at a high level,
which is purposefully structured to avoid the necessity of congressional
consent. Here, the WCI is likely a compact under the conscious
parallelism test. The WCI members have engaged in covert
coordination by individually passing parallel legislation to create the
WCI. Further, the WCI members have expressly coordinated their
actions through numerous interactions and organizations, may have
acted against self interest, and have manipulated the market for climate
change legislation. Thus, the WCI is likely a compact under the
conscious parallelism test.
C. Does the WCI Require CongressionalConsent?
1. Introduction
If the individual, parallel legislation of the WCI members is a
compact, Congress likely has to approve it. Textually, the Constitution
requires all interstate compacts "irrespective of form, subject, duration,
or interest to the United States" to receive congressional consent before
they are valid. 173 However, for over one hundred years judicial gloss on
the interstate compacts clause has limited the types of agreements
requiring congressional consent to compacts that could impact the
federal system. 74
In Virginia v. Tennessee, the Court limited the types of compacts
requiring congressional consent to those compacts "tending to the
increase of political power in the states, which may encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States."' 7 5 In Virginia v.
Tennessee, the states compacted to re-mark the boundary between their
states. 176 If the boundary line, when drawn, "cut off an important and
173.
174.
175.
176.

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 459 (1978).
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
Id. at 520.
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valuable portion of the state, the political power of the state enlarged
would be affected by the settlement of the boundary" and "the consent
of congress may well be required." 7 7 However, if the boundary simply
"serve[d] to mark and define that which actually existed before, but was
undefined and unmarked . . . the agreement . . . would in no respect
displace the relation of either of the states to the general
government."' 78 Thus, a distinction was drawn between compacts that
involved matters that were provincial such as the sale of a small parcel
of land between states, a contract for one state to transport another
state's goods, drainage of a swamp, and state cooperation to fight an
outbreak of disease-and compacts that were national and which
impacted the federal system such as agreements that increased "the
political power of the state."179
This limitation on the language of the Constitution has been justified
on at least three grounds. First, it was necessary because the meaning of
"agreement" and "compact" as used in the Constitution was unknown
by the time Virginia v. Tennessee was decided in 1893; thus, "it was
necessary to construe the terms of the Compact Clause by reference to
the object of the entire section in which it appears."' 80 The prohibition
on interstate compacts is listed in the Constitution alongside other state
action which could potentially hurt the federal government if abused."s'
For example, if states are allowed to keep troops or warships or to
engage in war without federal consent, federal military power would
weaken.' 82 Similarly, if states are allowed to create compacts that
impact the federal system, federal political power might weaken.
Second, given the large number of minor agreements that states must
make with each other in order to operate, the limitation on consent is
practically necessary.183 Third, the limitation is favored because it
supports the policy of increased state freedom to solve "supra-state, subfederal" problems without impairing the federal government's power to
stop improvident compacts.' 8
Later Supreme Court decisions expanded the ambit of compacts
requiring congressional consent to instances of mere potential impact on
the federal system.' 8 5 The dissent in MTC succinctly explained why a
177. Id.
178. Id. at 520-21.
179. Id. at 518, 520.
180. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 468 (1978).
181. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 10, cl. 3.
182. Id.
183. See Union Branch R.R. Co. v. E. Tenn. & Ga. R.R. Co., 14 Ga. 327, 340 (Ga. 1853).
184. MTC, 434 U.S. at 460 ("At this late date, we are reluctant to accept this invitation to
circumscribe modes of interstate cooperation that do not enhance state power to the detriment of
federal supremacy.").
185. Id. at 473.
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potential impact on the federal system triggered the need for
congressional approval by comparing the interstate commerce clause
and interstate compacts clause.1s
[There is an] important distinction between the Compact Clause
and the Commerce Clause. States may legislate in interstate
commerce until an actual impact upon the federal supremacy
occurs. For individual States, the harm of potential impact is
insufficiently upsetting to require prior congressional approval.
For States acting in concert, however, whether through informal
agreement, reciprocal legislation, or formal compact, "potential
. . . impact upon federal supremacy" is enough to invoke the
requirement of congressional approval.187
Thus, congressional consent is necessary if the WCI compact has a
potential impact on the federal system. Compacts can potentially impact
the federal system in several ways. First, the federal system is impacted
if compacting states have increased power over the federal
government;
second, the federal system is impacted if the compact
supersedes or conflicts with federal law;' 8 9 and third, the federal system
is impacted if noncompacting states are threatened.190 Finally, the
federal system is never impacted by local compacts.191
2. Increased State Power
The WCI impacts the federal system if the compacting states can
accomplish through a compact what they could not accomplish
individually.192 In MTC, states compacted to form the Multistate Tax
Commission which had the power to develop uniform tax regulations,
advise the states, and perform audits on the states behalf.193 Twenty-one
states were members of the compact' 94 which was designed to promote
uniform tax laws and prevent duplicative 95 taxation between states.196
The compact was formed after Congress "authorized a study for the
purpose of recommending legislation establishing uniform standards to
186. Id. at 484 (dissent).
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 472-73.
189. See U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
190. MTC, 434 U.S. at 477.
191. McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 545 (N.D. 1917).
192. MTC, 434 U.S. at 477.
193. Id. at 456-57.
194. Id. at 454, 456.
195. Id. at 455.
196. Id.
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be observed by the States in [taxation]." 9 7 Member States retained
complete control over all tax legislation and could withdraw from the
compact at any time.'9 8 The compact did not increase the power of
states over interstate commerce or foreign relations because the states
could carry out the functions of the compact individually and their
power vis-ai-vis the federal government had not increased. However, the
dissent criticized the majority for ignoring the potential and "actual
synergistic powers in the [compact]" which could work to undermine
federal resolve and actually increase state power in the taxation arena by
driving corporate clients to the compacting states. 99
The WCI does not impact the federal system because compacting
states do not have increased power over interstate commerce. The cap
and trade program issues permits and offsets that must be fungible
between 2urisdictions and must undertake a coordinated auction of
The permits and offsets might be considered articles of
permits.
commerce over which WCI members would exercise increased power
because only emitters within WCI jurisdictions are able to purchase
these products. 20 ' However, because the permits are the legal creation of
the WCI and have no value outside of the WCI jurisdictions, the WCI's
power over interstate commerce does not functionally increase. While
WCI members' power over interstate commerce might increase if the
WCI required emitters outside of the WCI to have permits to sell energy
inside of the WCI, the WCI only requires entities within WCI member
jurisdictions to have permits. 22 Admittedly, the WCI creates additional
burdens on interstate commerce within the WCI member jurisdictions.
However, "each State presumably could impose similar . . .
requirements individually." 20 3 Finally, while the WCI increases each
individual state's power to combat climate change by allowing the WCI
members to enact complimentary climate change legislation, synergistic
benefits from the coordinated action are not enough to impact the

197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 491 (White J., dissenting).

200.

DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 65, at 8-10.

201.

Symposium, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1621, 1659 (2008).

202.

DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 65, at 3. Cap and trade programs often

experience "leakage" problems where unregulated sources outside the regulated area are
imported into the regulated area and undercut domestic sources. The WCI cap and trade scheme
avoids leakage problems by regulating the First Jurisdictional Deliverer (FJD) of electricity. Id.
"For sources within WCI jurisdictions, the FJD is the generator." Id. "For power that is
generated outside the WCI jurisdictions (or generated by a federal entity or on tribal lands) for
consumption within a WCI jurisdiction, the FJD is the first entity that delivers that electricity
over which the consuming WCI jurisdiction has regulatory authority." Id.
203. MTC, 434 U.S. at 475.
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federal system.204
However, the WCI does impact the federal system by increasing the
compacting states' power over foreign policy. Sub-national
governments are not permitted to engage in foreign relations under U.S.
law. Foreign policy is generally considered the exclusive province of
the federal government under the "one voice" theory articulated in
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council2 05 and the Dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause theory upheld in Zschernig v. Miller.206 The WCI
gives its U.S. members a voice in foreign affairs they would not have
individually. First, the WCI establishes "collaborative efforts" between
U.S. states and foreign powers in Canada and Mexico on climate
change.20 7 Second, the WCI weakens the U.S. international bargaining
position on climate change. 20 8 Parts of the cap and trade program
require members to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. 209 By endorsing
the Kyoto Protocol the WCI destroys the united voice the federal
government has sounded against Kyoto and other international climate
change treaties. Third, if a U.S. state withdraws from or breaches the
WCI compact, the federal government is bound by action taken by
states toward foreign powers. Under the customary international law
doctrine of state responsibility, countries are potentially responsible for
violations of international agreements by their substate entities
regardless the legality of the violation under the state or substate's
domestic law. 2 10 Thus, under international law, the United States could
be responsible for a breach of the WCI agreement by California toward
Manitoba, for example. Because states can breach the WCI agreement
and expose the federal government to international embarrassment, state
power is increased vis-a-vis the federal government. In summary, the
WCI's voice in the international climate change policy arena increases
the WCI states' power relative to the federal government and, thus,
impacts the federal system.
3. Superseding Federal Law
If there is a possibility that the WCI compact will supersede or
conflict with federal law, then it impacts the federal system.2 ' IA
204. Id. at 496.
205. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 363.
206. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); see Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,
181 F. 3d 38, 66 (1st Cir. 1999).
207. Gregoire et al., supra note 1, at 2.
208. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 363.
209. DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 65, at 11 (stating that offset programs must
comply with the Kyoto protocol).
210. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
211. Marlissa S. Briggett, Comment, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The
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compact obviously impacts the federal system when it displaces federal
law that would otherwise be supreme. Conversely, compacts do not
impact the federal system when the compact is created pursuant to
federal law. In Northeast Bancorp, the Court noted that even if the
actions taken by the states constituted a compact, the compact would
not require congressional consent because the compact was passed
pursuant to a federal banking statute.213 Further, under the federal
avoidance doctrine, if the compact failed to comply with the federal law
that authorized it, then the compact would be preempted and "any
Compact Clause argument would be academic." 214
It is unlikely that the WCI supersedes or conflicts with federal law.
Congress has not passed climate change legislation. Congress has failed
to enact multiple proposals to address climate change including the
Clear Skies Act, which requires power plants to significantly reduce
emissions, 21521the Waxman-Markey federal cap and trade plan,2 16 an
information gathering approach favored by Senators Pete Domenici and
Jeff Bingaman, 217 and a command and control regulation approach
favored by Senator Jim Jeffords. 2 18 Congress's lack of action is not a
policy that the WCI can supersede or conflict with. In MTC, Congress
studied but failed to address the duplicative taxation problem the state
compact remedied.219 However, Congress's mere interest in the
problem of duplicative taxation did not bar the compact from going
forward.22 0 Similarly, Congress's study of climate change and floor
votes on climate change legislation do not bar the WCI. Therefore, the
WCI probably does not supersede or conflict with federal law.
4. Severe Economic Pressure on Noncompacting States
The WCI also impacts the federal system if it places severe
economic pressure on noncompacting states. In MTC, the economic
benefit the compact generated for Member States did not decrease the
political power of the nonparty states because "[a]ny time a State adopts
a fiscal policy or administrative policy that affects the programs of a
sister State, pressure to modify those programs may result . . .. [But] it
InterstateCompact, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 751, 758 (1991).
212. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
213. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 176
(1985).
214. Id.
215. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAw, supra note 6, at 86.
216. Id. at 87.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 90.
219. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Conun'n, 434 U.S. 452,455-56 (1978).
220. Id. n.33.
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is not clear how our federal structure is implicated."221 The compact's
provisions to reduce double taxation on businesses in compacting states
was not "an affront to the sovereignty of nonmember States" because
the compact's provisions did not "touch[] upon constitutional strictures"
and no "threat to the sovereignty of other States" existed.2 2 2 Thus, mere
economic pressure resulting from adoption of a particular policy by a
group of states does not impact the federal system unless the pressure
triggers some independent constitutional bar. 2 3
The competitive advantage the WCI members gain over other states
is not severe enough to impact the federal system. While the WCI
members gain a first mover advantage over other states with respect to
any subsequent mandatory climate change regulations, this advantage is
224
The
not enough to create a severe impact on non-WCI members.
future competitive advantage in climate change regulation that the WCI
offers to its members is no more of an advantage than the future
efficiency gains created by providing favorable tax laws to corporations
that the compacting states in MTC enjoyed. Thus, the WCI probably
does not severely impact noncompacting states.
5. Local Compact
Finally, the WCI does not impact the federal system if it is a local
compact. When a compact involves local matters there is no threat to
the federal system because the compact does not affect other states or
the federal government. For example, in McHenry County v. Brady, a
compact between the county board of commissioners in Meadow
township, North Dakota and the municipality of Arthur, Canada to place
a drain in the Canadian territory was not required to have congressional
consent because it was a matter "that can in no respect concern the
United States."22 5 Additionally, in Fisher v. Steele, the court
sarcastically noted that a compact was not "a treaty of alliance . . . a

joint scheme of commercial or industrial enterprise, or . . . the
establishment of a new confederacy," but was merely a compact
between Louisiana and Arkansas to build a levee and, thus, did not
require congressional consent. 226 In contrast, the Port Authority of New
York administers New York harbor, a vital U.S. port, and has annual
221. Id. at 478.
222. Id.
223. Id. But see Id. at 495 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that compacting states attract
multistate corporations and thus create economic pressure by offering uniform tax law across all
compacting states).
224. Id. at 479.
225. McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 545 (1917).
226. Fisher v. Steele, 1 So. 882, 888 (Sup. Ct. La. 1887).
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revenues in excess of one hundred million dollars.22 7 While it is local in
the sense that it governs a small geographic area, the compact creating
the Port Authority of New York is more than a local compact.2 2 8
The WCI is also not a local compact. While GHGs are emitted
locally within the WCI jurisdictions and environmental impacts are
ultimately felt locally, it is unlikely that the WCI would be considered a
local compact. 229 The WCI is not comparable to a contract to build a
levee or an agreement to locate a drain; rather it is a similar to the Port
of New York Authority compact which required congressional consent.
The WCI will soon administer a program that regulates a large
percentage of the U.S. economy and virtually all of Canada's
economy. 230 Additionally, after the cap and trade permit auctions begin
in 2012, the cap and trade program will probably have revenues
comparable to the Port Authority of New York. Finally, as the Supreme
Court noted in Massachusetts v. EPA, climate change is a global
problem. 23 1 Thus, the WCI is not a local compact.
In conclusion, the WCI does not supersede or conflict with federal
law, does not severely impact noncompacting states, and is not a local
compact. However, the WCI probably increases the power of the
compacting states vis-ei-vis the federal government because the U.S.
WCI members will have an increased voice in foreign affairs. Thus,
congressional consent is probably necessary for the WCI to be
constitutional.
D. Has Congress Consentedto the WCI?
Assuming that the WCI is a compact and that congressional consent
is required, the third inquiry in deciding if the WCI is a constitutional
interstate compact is whether Congress has consented. Congress may
consent in several ways. "The constitution does not state when the
consent of congress shall be given, whether it shall precede or may
follow the compact made, or whether it shall be express or may be
implied." 232 Congress may consent in at least four ways.
First, Congress may expressly consent in advance to state compacts.
For example, Congress consented in advance to the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers by enacting the Crime Control Consent Act of
227. Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (one hundred million
dollars in the 1960s).
22 8. Id.
229. Symposium Article, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is it Constitutional to
Think Globally andAct Locally?, 21 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 53, 57 (2003).
230. Arnoldy, supra note 2, at 1.
231. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 536 (2007).
232. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 521 (1893).
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1934.233 In the early part of the twentieth century, the federal
government actively encouraged interstate compacts by issuing broad
advanced consent to interstate compacts on a variety of national issues
like flood control, crime, and tobacco.2 34 However, the practice tapered
off after compacts failed to achieve significant success and were
.
-235
criticized as an inferior surrogate for national action.
Second, Congress may consent by expressly ratifying a completed
compact. For example, in North Carolina v. Tennessee, Tennessee was
created out of the territory of North Carolina.2 3 6 Congress expressly
consented to the boundary marker that was negotiated by the states.
Congressional consent was still valid even though the boundary varied
from the line Congress approved because the consent was "very

general." 238
Third, Congress may consent by implicitly ratifying previous state
compacts. For example, in Virginia v. Tennessee, congressional consent
was "fairly implied from [Congress's] subsequent legislation and
proceedings" when federal election districts were drawn based on the
boundary agreed upon in the compact. 239
Finally, Congress may be able to implicitly consent in advance to
state compacts. In Northeast Bancorp, states attempted to form a
compact pursuant to an exception to a federal banking law and the
compact was deemed consented to by Congress if the compact did not
violate the federal banking law. 2 40 The Court reasoned that Congress
created the exception in anticipation that states would compact.241 Thus,
Congress was deemed to have implicitly consented in advance to the
compact. However, Congress should not often be able to give implicit
advance consent because it does not allow Congress to consciously
consider the merits of a compact as it would with ratification and does
not allow Congress to negotiate the terms of the compact as it would
with express consent. In summary, "Congress may consent to an
interstate compact by authorizing joint state action in advance or by
giving expressed or implied approval to an agreement the States have
233. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 441 (1981). See also S. Rep. No. 73-1007, 1 (1934)
(noting that the CCCA was designed "to remove the obstruction imposed by the Federal
Constitution and allow the States cooperatively and by mutual agreement to work out their
problems of law enforcement").
234.

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
(1985).
241.

ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supra note 25, at 6.

Id. at 6-7.
North Carolina v. Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1, 6 (1914).
See id.
Id. at 16.
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 522 (1893).
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175
Id.
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already joined." 242 Congress may also be able to give implicit advance
consent.
Congress has no explicit or implicit power to change its consent to
an interstate compact once it has consented. 24 Compacts, once
consented to, are federal law.245 Further, Congress may not condition its
consent on the right to "alter, amend, or repeal" consent.246 Congress
may only attach conditions to its consent if the condition is
constitutional.24 7 Thus, Congress cannot use the "conditional spending"
ploy in the interstate compact context. However, Congress often uses its
consent power to force states to negotiate with the federal government
to create a compact more favorable to federal prerogatives. "Congress
is much more likely to permit a regional agreement if it can maintain
some control over the terms and enforcement of the compact." 249 Upon
successful negotiation, Congress will often pass legislation consenting

to the compact. 250
Congress may control continuing compacts, however, using its
plenary regulatory power to safeguard vital federal interests.25 For
example, in Tobin v. United States, Congress consented to a compact
creating the Port Authority of New York conditioned on the power to
"alter, amend, or repeal" its consent.2 52 While Congress could not
constitutionally condition its consent on the right to revoke its consent,
it could use its regulatory authority over vital federal interests like
interstate commerce and national defense to control the continuing
253
However, Congress is limited to
operations of the Port Authority.
regulating compacts through subsequent legislation and not through
mere agency or executive action.2 5 4
The WCI has not been consented to by Congress. First, Congress did
not give express consent in advance to the WCI. Congress is studying
climate change and investigating strategies to address the problem but
242. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 441 (1981).
243. See Appendix 1, Table 1, Summary of Congressional Consent Methods.
244. Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
245. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 566 (1855).
246. Tobin, 306 F.2d at 273.
247. Id. at 272-73 ("If Congress does not have the power under the Constitution, then it
cannot confer such power upon itself by way of a legislative fiat imposed as a condition to the
granting of its consent.").
248. Claire Carothers, Note, United We Stand: The Interstate Compact as a Tool For
Effecting Climate Change,41 GA. L. REv. 229, 257 (2006).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Tobin, 306 F.2d 270 at 273.
252. Id. at 271.
253. Id. at 274.
254. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 566 (1855).
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has not taken decisive action. 255 Thus, Congress has not requested the
WCI members to compact. Second, Congress has obviously not
expressly ratified the WCI. Third, Congress has not endorsed the WCI
by enacting a complementary cap and trade scheme to link with the
WCI system. Congress has not interfered with the WCI's efforts either,
however. Finally, Congress probably did not implicitly consent in
advance to the WCI's creation. No federal environmental law
encourages states to create climate change compacts on a level
comparable to the Northeast Bancorp banking law's endorsement of
regional banking.
State-foreign power compacts are even less likely to receive
congressional consent because Congress is unlikely to consent to a
compact that includes foreign members. On October 3, 2008, then
President George W. Bush signed a "joint resolution expressing the
consent and approval of Congress to an interstate compact regardin
water resources in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin."2
Congress refused to consent to the compact until separate agreements
were created for the Canadian and American sections of the Great
Lakes.257 The WCI faces a similar challenge from Congress regarding
consent as did the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Compact
given the enormous political and economic impact the WCI will have
on the United States once its cap and trade system is operational. The
Great Lakes Basin Compact was easily restructured and the WCI could
be as well. However, the WCI desires to be an international
agreement,258 and it is unlikely that the WCI would restructure to
placate Congress.

IV. CONCLUSION
States will continue to experiment with new methods of coordination
like the WCI given the current wave of federalism. The courts will
likely be faced with more ICC challenges to state authority to regulate
across state lines in the coming years, especially from businesses
regulated by the WCI cap and trade program beginning in 2012. States
will continue to try to mask their coordination by agreeing only to
principles in "memoranda of understanding" and by passing regulations
through independent state legislation. The application of the conscious
parallelism test to the ICC context advocated in this Article will help
courts effectively identify when state coordination like the WCI is a
255.

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW, supra note 6, at 86.

256.
257.
258.

S.J. Res. 45, 110th Cong. (2008).
Bielecki, supra note 41, at 199.
Design Update, supra note 4, at 5.
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compact requiring congressional consent.
Here, the WCI is an unconstitutional interstate compact in its present
form because it is a compact which requires but has not yet received
congressional consent. First, while the WCI resembles individual state
legislation, in reality, it is a compact governed by the ICC compacts
clause. While the WCI does not contain most of the classic indicia of a
compact and is likely not a compact under the contract test, the WCI is a
compact under the conscious parallelism test. WCI members have
consciously enacted parallel legislation and have expressly coordinated
their actions, acted against their self interest, and have "manipulated"
the climate change regulation market. Second, the WCI requires federal
approval through congressional consent. The WCI does not supersede
or conflict with federal law, prejudice noncompacting states, and is not
a local compact, but, the WCI increases the power of the compacting
states by inserting those states' voices into U.S. foreign policy on
climate change. Third, Congress has not chosen to consent to the WCI
yet.
The WCI was formed with little more than a handshake. Five
governors sat down together and decided to address GHG emissions and
climate change while Congress sat on its hands. Though their actions
were noble, the WCI members needed congressional approval before
they could regulate. For all their good intentions, handshake deals like
the WCI which establish sufficiently weighty regulatory schemes are
simply not constitutional without federal approval.
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Appendix 1.
Table 1 Summary of Congressional Consent Methods
Consent in Advance
Explicit Consent

Implicit Consent

Ratification

Cession Act ratifying
Crime Control
Consent Act of 1934 border
Carolinav.
v(North
(
Tense
(Cuylerv. Adams)
Tennessee)
Statute does not bar Using border compact
states from enacting to define federal
reciprocal legislation election jurisdictions
(NortheastBancorp) (Virginia v. Tennessee)
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